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Who Should Live-
or Die? 
Who Should Decide? 
Editor's Note: YaleKamisar, the Henrv 
K Ransom proftssor of law at the University 
of Michigan Law School, is the author of 
numerous books and articles on criminal jus-
tice as well as articles on euthanasia. TRIAL 
asked Proftssor Kamisar questions on legal 
and ethical issues surrounding the right to 
die, a subject attracting increasing interest 
across the country and around the world. 
What is the difference between active 
and passive euthanasia? 
This question has long been the 
subject of widespread and spirited de-
bate by lawyers, doctors, philosophers, 
and ethicists. One group of commenta-
tors believes that the distinction between 
active and passive euthanasia is a crucial 
one. But another group of commenta-
tors has belittled the distinction, main-
taining that it is morally evasive and dis-
ingenuous to condemn positive acts of 
euthanasia and yet approve negative strat-
egies designed to achieve the same pur-
pose. I agree with the second group. 
Over the years, some proponents of 
euthanasia, such as the late Dr. Joseph 
Fletcher, the noted Protestant ethicist, 
have attacked the distinction, but many 
of his allies have sought to preserve it. 
They are well aware that the public is 
much more ready and willing to accept 
"letting die" than "killing" (even when 
it is in "mercy"). 
Unlike many proponents of the right 
to die, who deem it important to main-
tain the distinction so that passive eu-
thanasia not be tainted in any way by 
the active euthanasia movement, I be-
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lieve that passive euthanasia should be 
tainted by that movement. We should 
not withdraw or withhold life support 
when we know full well that that course 
of action will bring about death-indeed, 
when our very purpose is to achieve that 
result-unless we are willing to accept 
responsibility for what we are really 
doing. Perhaps passive euthanasia should 
be permitted in some cases, but only 
when direct, straightforward euthanasia 
would be. 
I have considered the arguments made 
by proponents of the active/passive eu-
thanasia distinction for a long time. I 
must say I do not find them persuasive. 
We are told, for example, that removing 
the ban against euthanasia would be to 
"embrace the assumption that one hu-
man being has the power of life over 
another." (New York State Task Force on 
Life and the La~ Life-Sustaining Treat-
ment 42 (1987).) But withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment 
embraces that very assumption. 
We are also told by a group favoring 
passive euthanasia in certain circumstances 
that maintaining the prohibition against 
active euthanasia "prevents the grave 
potential for abuse inherent in any law 
that sanctions the taking of human life." 
(Id.) But passive euthanasia, at the very 
least, presents the same potential for 
abuse. 
Indeed, I would go further. I would 
say that because of the repugnance sur-
rounding active euthanasia-because it 
is what might be called straightforward 
or "out-in-the-open" euthanasia-it is 
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probably less likely to be abused than 
less readily recognizable forms of passive 
euthanasia. 
Will you elaborate with an example? 
Many Down's syndrome newborns 
have been "allowed to die" through fail-
ure to remove an intestinal blockage or 
otherwise perform relatively simple sur-
gery. Very few would have died if par-
ents and physicians had had to consent 
to lethal injection rather than starvation 
or dehydration as the method of death. 
Very few of these newborn babies would 
have died if parents and physicians had 
been unable to deny what they had really 
done-if they had had to accept the 
responsibility for "killing" rather than 
"letting die." 
I want to make one thing quite clear. 
I do not favor active euthanasia. Rather 
I am greatly troubled by the degree to 
which passive euthanasia has gained ac-
ceptance. My purpose in debunking the 
active/passive distinction is to get us to 
re-examine what we have been doing 
passively or negatively and to feel more 
uncomfortable about it. 
But others who dismiss the distinction 
have a very different purpose. Convinced 
that negative or passive euthanasia is a 
fait accompli in modern medicine, this 
group is trying to belittle the active/ 
passive distinction to get more doctors 
(and others) to engage in active eutha-
nasia and to feel more comfortable about 
it. They are making a lot of headway, 
as the strong support for Washington 
state's "Death with Dignity" Initiative 
119 illustrates. The initiative didn't pass, 
but until the last few weeks of the cam-
paign it was supported by large majori-
ties. In the ncar future voters in other 
states will be asked to vote on similar 
proposals. The way things are going, by 
the year 2001 proponents of euthanasia 
will succeed, at least in some states. 
Iflaw and ethics were entirely syllogis-
tic, it would be hard to distinguish be-
tween active and passive euthanasia. But 
we can't overlook the psychological ef-
fect-the symbolic impact-oflegalizing 
active euthanasia. In a speech I gave 
some years ago, I said that passive eutha-
nasia had gained so much acceptance 
that our "official morality" -the pro-
hibition against euthanasia-had become 
"a woefully outflanked Maginot Line." 
But that doesn't mean we shouldn't 
grieve over the fall of the Maginot Line. 
When you erase the distinction between 
letting die or dying a natural death and 
direct killing, the Maginot Line falls. 
Is the distinction between active and 
passive euthanasia likely to be pre-
served in the future? 
I don't think so. In recent years I've 
talked to a great many people about this 
subject. Although they differ widely on 
other aspects of this problem, almost 
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everybody seems to agree on one point: 
Sooner or later the distinction will dis-
appear-active euthanasia will "collapse" 
into passive euthanasia-and both forms 
of euthanasia will become widely 
acceptable. 
We moved a significant step in that 
direction in recent years, when most 
courts and most bioethicists rejected any 
distinction between turning off the res-
pirator and removing the feeding tube. 
In the 1960s and 1970s that distinction 
was deemed important. Recall that Karen 
Quinlan's parents did not request per-
mission to remove the feeding tube that 
was to keep their daughter alive for an-
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other nine years. If they had, they prob-
ably would have been rebuffed. 
But the law and medical opinion moved 
very quickly in the decade and a half 
since the QJtinlan case was decided. In 
a relatively short time, theright-to-die 
movement was powerful enough to over-
ride the once-formidable distinction 
between terminating artificial nutrition 
and hydration and ending other forms 
of life support. As a result of this, the 
psychological distinction between killing 
and letting die was significantly under-
mined. 
Define "dying" and "tenninally ill." 
How are these tenns different from 
"persistent vegetative state" (PVS)? 
The terms dying and terminally ill 
have been used very loosely. One reason 
is that those who favor refusing or with-
drawing life-sustaining treatment find it 
good strategy to characterize the patient 
as dying or terminally ill. This positions 
them to say that removing or withhold-
ing life support is not terminating a life 
but merely preventing the "drawing out" 
of the "dying process." 
As usually defined, and as defined in 
Missouri (where the Cruzan case arose) 
and in many other states, the terms dy-
. ing and terminally ill mean that a pa-
tient's condition will shortly result in 
death regardless of the use of available 
medical treatment. Under this definition 
(and this may surprise a lot of people), 
neither Karen Ann Quinlan nor Nancy 
Beth Cruzan was dying or terminally ill. 
Quinlan probably could have been 
kept alive if her respirator had not been 
removed. Indeed, she stayed alive for 9 
years after it was removed. As for Cruzan, 
it is generally agreed that if kept on the 
feeding tube she might have lived for 
another 20 or 30 years. 
Of course, one may say (and many 
people have) that PVS patients should 
have their life support disconnected be-
cause they "might as well be dead" or 
they are "better off dead." (This is the 
principal reason many people fuvor termi-
nating life-sustaining treatment in cases 
like QJtinlan and Cruzan.) But to say 
that is to wrestle with the very elusive 
question of a life not worth living. 
If death is unpreventable-if the best 
that medicine has to offer can postpone 
death for only a short time-it makes 
some sense to say that the underlying 
illness "caused" the death or that dis-
continuing life support merely permitted 
death to occur. But when a patient can 
be kept alive for many years it is hard 
22 
to avoid the conclusions that we have 
made a quality-of-life judgment and that 
the removal of life support rather than 
the underlying illness brought about the 
patient's death. 
If Washington state voters had ap-
proved "Death with Dignity" Initia-
tive 119 in November, they would have 
legalized voluntary euthanasia only 
for the tenninally ill-those who have 
six months or less to live-who make 
a written request to die. Is a rennin-
ally ill limitation very important? 
Yes, but if the proposal had been ap-
I can>t think of a problem 
that raises more 
fundamental moral> 
political, and legal 
questions than euthanasia. 
proved, I don't think the distinction be-
tween euthanasia for the terminally ill 
and euthanasia for other severely ill peo-
ple would have lasted very long. 
Although proponents of voluntary 
euthanasia were defeated in Washington 
state, they will be back. They tell us they 
will soon try again in Oregon, California, 
and Florida. They will probably again 
propose active euthanasia only for the 
terminally ill. But their arguments out-
run euthanasia for that limited group. 
If, as proponents of euthanasia say, 
people ought to have the right to con-
trol their own destiny-the right to choose 
what they regard as the most "humane" 
or "dignified" way to end their lives-
why should that right be confined to 
the terminally ill? Why don't these argu-
ments apply, at the very least, to non-
terminally ill persons who are gravely ill 
or seriously disabled? 
It may be good strategy to limit vol-
untary euthanasia to the terminally ill-
as a first step-but I am convinced that 
if and when such a proposal is approved, 
euthanasia for the terminally ill will turn 
out to be an intermediate phase in the 
movement toward more and more vol-
untary euthanasia and then, I am afraid, 
nonvoluntary euthanasia. If the modern 
history of the ethics of death and dying 
demonstrates anything, it is that what 
we cannot do-perhaps cannot even think 
seriously about doing-in one step we 
are often able to do in two or three. 
Living will statutes generally demand 
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that a terminal condition be present be-
fore the living will becomes effective. 
But in response to strong criticism that 
such a restriction unduly limits the ben-
efits of such legislation, some states have 
greatly relaxed the definition of termi-
nally ill or eliminated the requirement 
altogether. The same pressures, I am 
afraid, are likely to expand the category 
of those eligible for active euthanasia 
well beyond the terminally ill. 
What is the difference between ex-
traordinary and ordinary means of 
life support? Is this distinction likely 
to be preserved in the future? 
No. In fact, it has pretty much dis-
appeared already. At one time this dis-
tinction may have been a helpful tool 
of analysis, but participants in the right-
to-die debate soon poured into it all the 
factors relevant to appropriate moral 
decisions, however nonmedical they 
might be. As a result, treatment that is 
usual, even routine-antibiotics, simple 
surgery, intravenous feeding-was called 
"extraordinary" or "heroic" in light of 
a given patient's condition. 
To say, as many did, that a simple 
operation to remove an intestinal block-
age is a non-obligatory extraordinary treat-
ment when the patient is a Down's 
syndrome baby or that the use of anti-
biotics to combat pneumonia is extra-
ordinary when the patient is senile or 
that insulin is extraordinary for a diabet-
ic patient who develops inoperable can-
cer is circular reasoning. Extraordinary 
treatment came to mean treatment that 
was considered undesirable or inappro-
priate in relation to the medical con-
dition of a given patient. 
But why was treatment inappropriate 
under the circumstance? Evidently it 
was because those who called the treat-
ment extraordinary thought there was 
no point in keeping the patient alive 
under the circumstances. Thus, it be-
came very difficult to distinguish the ex-
traordinary means doctrine from advo-
cacy of passive or negative euthanasia. 
Those who think termination of life-
sustaining treatment is called for can 
simply label the treatment heroic or 
extraordinary. 
The extraordinary/ordinary means dis-
tinction has been severely criticized (see, 
eg., President1s Commission for the Study 
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bio-
medical and Behavioral Research, Deciding 
to Forego Lifo-Sustaining Treatment 82-89 
(1983)) and is now widely rejected. And 
rightly so. The distinction became so 
spongy and unilluminating that there 
was little to be said for retaining it. 
But over the years this doctrine per-
formed a function: It confused and se-
duced us. It led many to believe that 
only certain kinds oflife support could 
be, and would be, terminated-that dis-
connecting an unconscious patient's res-
pirator in some vague way constituted 
only a very slight and a very limited de-
viation from our official morality. This 
doctrine has moved us down the slip-
pery slope. 
You have said that determination of 
a patient's condition must be made 
by doctors but that whether a patient 
should die is a "moral-legal-philosophi-
cal-political question" that should 
not be left to doctors. The courts are 
the place for deciding legal questions. 
Should anyone else be involved in the 
decision-making process? 
Every profession would like to police 
itself. Every group (and I include law 
faculties as well as police departments 
and school boards) resents an "outside" 
group looking over its shoulder. 
But despite their expertise, we don't 
let the police decide for themselves when 
they can kill a fleeing felon. Rather we 
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say (and rightly so) that this is a legal 
policy issue to be decided by the legisla-
ture or the courts. 
Doctors can tell us whether a person's 
condition is incurable or irreversible or 
whether a person is in a persistent vege-
tative state or in some other condition. 
But the typical doctor is not a lawyer 
or a philosopher or an ethicist. And 
deciding whether the life of a severely 
ill person is worth living-whether a pa-
tient's state of existence is sufficiently 
good to justifY any further medical treat-
ment-is not a question that doctors are 
uniquely, or even specially, qualified to 
answer. 
Of course, doctors have been answering 
these very questions. That's because de-
ciding these excruciating life-or-death 
matters is a "dirty business" -a subject 
that neither courts nor legislatures have 
been eager to get into. For a long time 
the legal system has more or less abdicated 
its responsibility and the doctors have 
filled the vacuum. 
As many have said, this area is primar-
ily one for the legislature, not the courts. 
We can't expect our courts to limp along 
without getting more guidance than 
they have been provided up to now. In 
considering and drafting legislation we 
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should welcome the input of many 
groups-medical ethicists, psychiatrists, 
psychologists, philosophers, people from 
different religious traditions, all kinds of 
health professionals-as well as input 
from lawyers. 
I can't think of a problem that raises 
more fundamental moral, political, and 
legal questions than euthanasia. And if 
lawyers are not well equipped to play a 
large role in grappling with them, who 
is? We will not and should not relish 
the task. But neither should we shrink 
from it. 
How is a more conservative Supreme 
Court likely to rule in the future in 
cases like Cruzan? 
Although they did not achieve the re-
sult they desired in Cruzan, right-to-die 
proponents did secure two significant 
victories: The Court seems to have re-
jected any distinction (l) between the 
feeding tube and other forms of life sup-
port and (2) between dying or terminal-
ly ill patients and those whose condi-
tions have stabilized and who could be 
kept alive for many years. 
But two of the justices who supported 
a right to die have retired, and both of 
their replacements will probably join 
--, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the three 
justices who sided with him (Kennedy, 
Scalia, and White). (Although Justice 
O'Connor also joined the chief justice, 
her separate concurring opinion really 
put her at a considerable distance from 
him.) 
As a result of the change in the Court's 
personnel, the chief justice's avoidance 
of the phrase "a right to refuse treat-
ment" (emphasis added), one used by 
many state courts, and his preference for 
the phrase ''liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment" (emphasis 
added) take on added significance. 
I share the view of Professor John 
Robertson of the University of Texas 
School of Law: By avoiding "fundamen-
tal rights" language-by declining to 
regard a right to refuse treatment as "en-
compassed by a generalized right of pri-
vacy" -the Court indicated that it would 
restrict this "liberty interest" on a lesser 
showing of need than it would require 
if that interest were regarded as a funda-
mental right. (See Robertson, Cruzan 
and the Constitutional Status of Nontreat-
ment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 
GA. L. REV. 1139, 1174 (1991).) 
The "opposite" of the typical right-
to-die case has surfaced in Minnesota. 
A public hospital sought permission 
to remove a respirator from an 87-
year-old woman in a persistent vege-
tative state whose family opposed the 
request. The hospital said continuing 
treatment was not in the woman's 
personal or medical interest. The fam-
ily won; the woman died a day later. 
Does a patient have the right to de-
mand unceasing medical treatment in 
a hopeless case? Is the outcome of this 
case likely to affect outcomes in more 
typical right-to-die cases? 
A growing number of commentators 
are arguing that PVS patients should be 
viewed as dead or that the legal defini-
tion of death should be expanded to in-
clude such persons. A number of people 
find this approach appealing-so long as 
the family wants the life support to be 
terminated. However, many of these 
same people become uneasy when the 
family wants to keep the patient on life 
support. 
Suppose a state defines a PVS patient 
or a person otherwise permanently un-
conscious as dead. That would mean 
that a hospital could require the termi-
nation of life support over the objection 
of every close family member .. (I know 
of cases where a hospital has done just 
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that when the patient has met the then-
current definition of the term "brain 
dead.") 
Furthermore, I think that classifYing 
a PVS patient as dead would mean that 
a hospital could require terminating life 
support even though, when still a vi-
brant person, the patient explicitly stated 
in writing a desire to be kept alive even 
if permanently unconscious. Dead is 
dead. Moreover, why bother turning off 
respirators or removing feeding tubes? 
Why not simply administer lethal injec-
tion? Again, dead is dead. 
Up to llOW, most of our attention has 
been focused on the constitutional lim-
itations, if any, that may be placed on 
a state like Missouri that takes a "vitalist" 
position, that is, regards all human life 
worthy of protection regardless of its 
quality. But the Minnesota case raises, 
or at least suggests, a different -and largely 
neglected-issue: What constitutional 
restraints, if any, may be imposed 
on jurisdictions that adopt a "nonvital-
ist'' policy, that is, consider life worth 
protecting only if that life meets cer-
tain minimal or acceptable standards of 
quality? 
Are PVS patients considered "persons" 
under the United States Constitution? 
If a state wanted to define such patients 
as dead, would the Constitution prevent 
it from doing so? Professor Robertson 
thinks not. If Robertson is right, what 
follows? Could a PVS patient be used 
if a state so elects as a source of organs 
for needy patients or as a subject of 
experimentation? 
If a state has the constitutional power 
to define PVS patients or other perma-
nently unconscious persons as dead, what 
next? If a number of states expanded 
their definition of death to include per-
manently unconscious persons, does 
anybody really doubt that lO or 20 years 
down the road some states would ex-
pand the definition again-this time to 
include;. at the· very least, elderly, in-
competent patients who could be de-
scril:;led as minimally responsive or bare-
ly conscious? 
The first case testing the constitution-
al power of a nonvitalist state in this re-
gard could involve an elderly ward of the 
state who left no written directive, who 
either has no known family members or 
has been abandoned by them, and whose 
quality of life is "marginal." If such a 
case were to be argued in the U.S. Su-
preme Court, as well it may be some-
day, which side would be the "liberal" 
L"_'_••_"_'"_"_.,_. ------------------------------'side and which the "conservative"?D 
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